来书云:「聪明睿知果质乎?仁义礼智果性乎?喜怒哀乐果情乎?私欲客气果一物乎?二物乎?古之其才,若子房、仲舒、叔度、孔明、文中、韩、范诸公[1],德业表著,皆良知中所发也,而不得谓之闻道者,果何在乎?苟曰此特生质之美耳,则生知、安行者,不愈于学知、困勉者乎[2]?愚意窃云谓诸公见道偏则可,谓全无闻则恐后儒崇尚记诵训诂之过也。然乎?否乎?」
性一而已。仁、义、礼、知,性之性[3]也;聪、明、睿、知,性之质也;喜、怒、哀、乐,性之情也;私欲、客气,性之蔽也。质有清浊,故情有过不及,而蔽有浅深也;私欲、客气,一病两痛,非二物也。张、黄、诸葛及韩、范诸公,皆天质之美,自多暗合道妙,虽未可尽谓之知学,尽谓之闻道,然亦自其有学,违道不远者也;使其闻学知道,即伊、傅、周、召[4]矣。若文中子则又不可谓之不知学者,其书虽多出于其徒,亦多有未是处,然其大略则亦居然可见,但今相去辽远,无有的然凭证,不可悬断其所至矣。夫良知即是道,良知之在人心,不但圣贸,虽常人亦无不如此。若无有物欲牵蔽,但循著真知发用流行将去,即无不是道。但在常人多为物欲牵蔽,不能循得良知。如数公者,天质既自清明,自少物欲为之牵蔽,则其良知之发用流行处,自然是多,自然违道不远。学者学循此良知而已。谓之知学,只是知得专在学循良知。数公虽未知专在良知上用功,而或泛滥于多歧,疑迷于影响,是以或离或合而未纯。若知得时,便是圣人矣。后儒尝以数子者,尚皆是气质用事,未免于行不著,习不察,此亦未为过论。但后儒之所谓著、察者,亦是狃于闻见之狭,蔽于沿习之非,而依拟仿象于影响形迹之间,尚非圣门之所谓著、察者也。则亦安得以己之昏昏,而求人之昭昭也乎?所谓生知、安行,「知、行」二字,亦是就用功上说;若是知、行本体,即是良知、良能,虽在困勉之人,亦皆可谓之生知、安行矣。知、行二字更宜精察。
Your letter says: 'Are intelligence and wisdom truly inborn endowment? Are humaneness, rightness, propriety, wisdom truly nature? Joy, anger, sorrow, pleasure — truly feeling? Are private desire and temperamental energy one thing or two? The great talents of old — Zhang Liang, Dong Zhongshu, Huang Xian, Zhuge Liang, Wang Tong, Han Qi, Fan Zhongyan — their virtue illustrious, all issuing from innate knowledge, yet not to be called hearers of the Way: where exactly do they fall short? If it is merely fineness of endowment, do the born-knowing surpass the learning-and-striving? I venture that to say their seeing of the Way was partial is fair; to say they wholly missed it is, I fear, the fault of later scholars' worship of recital and gloss. Is that so?'
Nature is one. Humaneness, rightness, propriety, wisdom are nature's nature; intelligence and wisdom, nature's endowment; joy, anger, sorrow, pleasure, nature's feelings; private desire and temperamental energy, nature's veil. Endowment is clear or turbid, hence feeling errs past or short and the veil lies thin or thick. Desire and temper are one sickness with two aches, not two things. Zhang Liang, Dong Zhongshu, Huang Xian, Zhuge Liang, Han Qi, Fan Zhongyan — all of finest natural endowment, much unconsciously according with the subtlety of the Way; one cannot wholly call them knowers of the learning or hearers of the Way, yet theirs was a learning of its own, not far from the Way; had they heard the learning and known the Way, they had been Yi Yin, Fu Yue, the Duke of Zhou, Duke Shao. As for Wang Tong, he can by no means be called ignorant of learning: his book, though largely from disciples' hands and often at fault, shows its broad outline plainly; only, the distance is now so great, with no certain proof, that his attainment cannot be judged from mid-air. Innate knowledge is the Way. In the human heart — not the sage's only, every person's without exception — were there no dragging veil of thing-desire, flowing simply along innate knowledge's working, nothing would not be the Way. But the many are dragged and veiled and cannot follow it. Men of such endowment, clear from birth, little veiled by desire — innate knowledge's working flows wide in them, and they stand not far from the Way. The learner learns to follow this innate knowledge; knowing the learning means knowing to work solely at following it. These men, not knowing to work solely at innate knowledge — some scattered among branching paths, some lost among shadows and echoes — were now apart, now conjoined, never pure. Had they known, they were sages. Later scholars say these men still acted from temperament, acting without penetration, practicing without awareness — no overstatement. But the later scholars' penetration and awareness, itself penned in narrow hearsay, veiled by inherited error, aping and miming among shadows and traces, is not the school's penetration and awareness. With one's own self dim, how demand brightness of others? As for born-knowing-acting-at-ease: the very words knowing and acting are said of applying effort; of the original substance of knowing and acting they are innate knowledge and innate ability — even in those who strive through hardship, all may be called born-knowing and acting-at-ease. The two words merit fine examination.