传习录

答欧阳崇一

168

崇一来书云:「师云:『德性之良知,非由于闻见,若曰多闻择其善者而从之,多见而识之,则是专求之见闻之末,而已落在第二义。』窃意良知虽不由见闻而有,然学者之知,未尝不由见闻而发;滞于见闻固非,而见闻亦良知之用也。今曰『落在第二义』,恐为专以见闻为学者而言。若致其良知而求之见闻,似亦知、行合一之功矣。如何?」

良知不由见闻而有,而见闻莫非良知之用,故良知不滞于见闻,而亦不离于见闻。孔子云:「吾有知乎哉?无知也。」良知之外,别无知矣。故「致良知」是学问大头脑,是圣人[1]教人第一义。今云专求之见闻之末,则是失却头脑,而已落在第二义矣。近时同志中,盖已莫不知有「致良知」之说,然其功夫尚多鹘突者[2],正是欠此一问。大抵学问功夫只要主意头脑是当,若主意头脑专以「致良知」为事,则凡多闻、多见,莫非「致良知」之功。盖日用之间,见闻醻酢,虽千头万绪,莫非良知之发用流行;除却见闻醻酢,亦无良知可致矣。故只是一事。若曰致其良知而求之见闻,则语意之间未免为二。此与专求之见闻之末者虽稍不同,其为未得精一之旨,则一而已。「多闻择其善者而从之,多见而识之。」既云择,又云识,其良知[3]亦未尝不行于其间,但其用意[4]乃专在多闻、多见上去择、识,则已失却头脑矣。崇一于此等处见得当已分晓,今日之问,正为发明此学,于同志中极有益。但语意未莹,则毫厘千里,亦不容不精察之也。

崇一来信说:「老师说:『德性之良知不是由于闻见。若说多闻择其善者而从之、多见而识之,那是专求之于见闻之末,已落在第二义。』我私下以为,良知虽不由见闻而有,但学者的知未尝不由见闻而发;滞于见闻固然不对,而见闻也是良知之用。如今说『落在第二义』,恐怕是专对以见闻为学的人说的。若致其良知而于见闻上求,似乎也是知行合一的功夫了。如何?」

良知不由见闻而有,而见闻莫非良知之用,所以良知不滞于见闻,而也不离于见闻。孔子说:「吾有知乎哉?无知也。」良知之外别无知了。所以「致良知」是学问的大头脑,是圣人教人的第一义。如今说专求之见闻之末,那是失掉了头脑,已落在第二义。近来同志中大概已无人不知有「致良知」之说,然而功夫尚多含糊的,正是欠此一问。大抵学问功夫只要主意头脑妥当,若主意头脑专以「致良知」为事,那么多闻多见,莫非「致良知」的功夫。日常之间,见闻酬酢,虽千头万绪,莫非良知的发用流行;除却见闻酬酢,也就没有良知可致了。所以只是一件事。若说致其良知而于见闻上求,语意之间未免分成两个。这与专求之于见闻之末的虽稍有不同,但都未得精一之旨则是一样的。「多闻择其善者而从之,多见而识之」,既说择、又说识,良知也未尝不运行其间,只是那用意专在多闻多见上去择、去识,便已失掉头脑了。崇一在这些地方应当已看得分晓,今日之问正是为发明此学,对同志极有益处。只是语意未透,便差之毫厘谬以千里,也不容不精察。

Chongyi's letter says: 'You say virtue's innate knowledge does not come of hearing and seeing; that hearing much and choosing the good, seeing much and remembering, seeks only the twig-ends of sight and hearsay, second-best. Yet though innate knowledge exists not by sight and hearsay, the learner's knowing surely is triggered by them; sticking in them is wrong, but they are also innate knowledge's use. That it falls to second-best, I take it, is said against those who make sight and hearsay their whole study. To extend innate knowledge and seek it within hearing and seeing seems already the work of knowledge and action united. Is it so?'

Innate knowledge exists not by sight and hearsay, yet sight and hearsay are all its use: it sticks in neither, and departs from neither. Confucius: have I knowledge? I have none. Beyond innate knowledge there is no other knowing. Hence extending innate knowledge is the great head of all learning, the sage's first principle in teaching. To seek solely at the twig-ends of sight and hearsay is to lose the head and fall to second-best. Among our fellows of late hardly any do not know the phrase extending innate knowledge, yet the work of many is still hazy — just for want of this one question. Provided the head of the work is right — the one affair being extending innate knowledge — then hearing much and seeing much are all its work. Daily sight, hearsay and exchange, a thousand threads and ten thousand strands, are all innate knowledge's working and flowing; apart from them there is no innate knowledge to extend. Hence it is one affair only. To say extend innate knowledge and seek it in hearing and seeing still splits the sense in two — differing a little from the twig-end seekers, but equally short of refinement-unity. Hearing much, choose the good and follow; seeing much, remember: with choosing and remembering, innate knowledge too ran through it all — only the intent was set on choosing and remembering upon the much-heard and much-seen, and so the head was lost. You, Chongyi, must see this clearly already; today's question precisely unfolds this learning, of great use to our fellows. But where the sense is not crystal, a hair's miss is a thousand miles: fine examination may not be spared.

  1. 「圣人」,施本、俞本、德安府南本并作「圣门」。
  2. 「然其功夫」,施本、俞本、德安府南本并作「然其间功夫」。鹘突:糊涂。
  3. 「其良知」,德安府南本作「则良知」。
  4. 「但其用意」,施本、俞本、王本、德安府南本并作「但其立意」。
169

来书云:「师云:『《系》言「何思何虑」,是言所思所虑只是天理,更无别思别虑耳,非谓无思无虑也。心之本体即是天理,有何可思虑得?学者用功,虽千思万虑,只是要复他本体,不是以私意去安排思索出来;若安排思索,便是自私用智矣。』学者之蔽,大率非沈空守寂,则安排思索。德辛壬[1]之岁著前一病,近又著后一病,但思索亦是良知发用,其与私意安排者何所取别?恐认贼作子,惑而不知也。」

「思曰睿,睿作圣。」「心之官则思,思则得之。」思其可少乎?沈空守寂与安排思索,正是自私用智,其为丧失良知一也。良知是天理之昭明灵觉处,故良知即是天理,思是良知之发用。若是良知发用之思,则所思莫非天理矣。良知发用之思,自然明白简易。良知亦自能知得。若是私意安排之思,自是纷纭劳扰。良知亦自会分别得。盖思之是非邪正,良知无有不自知者。所以认贼作子,正为致知之学不明,不知在良知上体认之耳。

来信说:「老师说:『《系辞》说「何思何虑」,是说所思所虑只是天理,更无别的思虑,并非无思无虑。心之本体即是天理,还有什么可思虑的?学者用功,虽千思万虑,只是要恢复他的本体,不是以私意去安排思索出来;若安排思索,便是自私用智了。』学者的毛病,大抵不是沉空守寂,就是安排思索。我在辛壬年间犯前一种病,近来又犯后一种。但思索也是良知的发用,它与私意安排的区别在哪里?恐怕认贼作子,迷而不知啊。」

「思曰睿,睿作圣。」「心之官则思,思则得之。」思怎么可以少呢?沉空守寂与安排思索,正是自私用智,同样丧失良知。良知是天理昭明灵觉之处,所以良知就是天理,思是良知的发用。若是良知发用之思,那么所思的无非天理。良知发用之思,自然明白简易,良知也自然能知道。若是私意安排之思,自然纷纭劳扰,良知也自然会分辨。思的是非邪正,良知无有不自知的。之所以认贼作子,正因为致知之学不明,不知道在良知上体认罢了。

Your letter says: 'You said the Commentaries' what-to-think-what-to-worry means all thought is heavenly principle with no other thought — not thoughtlessness. The mind's substance being heavenly principle, what is there to think out? The learner's ten thousand thoughts only restore its substance, not something schemed by private intent — scheming is wit in selfishness. The learner's fault is mostly either dead holding of vacancy or scheming thought. In the xin-ren years I had the former; of late the latter. But thinking too is innate knowledge's working — how does it differ from private scheming? I fear taking the thief for the son, lost and unaware.'

Thinking is penetration, and penetration makes the sage. The mind's office is to think; thinking, it attains. How could thinking be lessened? Dead vacancy and scheming thought are precisely wit in selfishness, alike in forfeiting innate knowledge. Innate knowledge is where heavenly principle is bright and numinous: innate knowledge is heavenly principle, and thinking is its working. Thought that is innate knowledge's working thinks nothing but heavenly principle — naturally clear and simple, and innate knowledge knows it of itself. Thought that is private scheming is naturally tangled and harassing, and innate knowledge discerns it of itself. Of every thought's right and wrong, crooked and straight, innate knowledge cannot fail to know. Taking the thief for the son happens only because the learning of extension is dark and one does not know to recognize it upon innate knowledge.

  1. 辛壬:辛巳(1521),壬午(1522)。
170

来书又云:「师云:『为学终身只是一事,不论有事无事,只是这一件。若说宁不了事,不可不加培养,却是分为两事也。』窃意觉精力衰弱,不足以终事者,良知也;宁不了事,且加休养,致知也。如何却为两事?若事变之来,有事势不容不了,而精力虽衰,稍鼓舞亦能支持,则持志以帅气可矣。然言动终无气力,毕事则困惫已甚,不几于暴其气已乎?此其轻重缓急,良知固未尝不知,然或迫于事势,安能顾精力?或因于精力,安能顾事势?如之何则可?」

「宁不了事,不可不加培养」之意,且与初学如此说,亦不为无益,但作两事看了,便有病痛在。孟子言必有事焉,则君子之学终身只是「集义」一事。义者,宜也,心得其宜之谓义。能致良知则心得其宜矣,故「集义」亦只是致良知。君子之酬酢万变,当行则行,当止则止,当生则生,当死则死,斟酌调停,无非是致其良知,以求自慊而已。故「君子素其位而行」,「思不出其位」,凡谋其力之所不及,而强其知之所不能者,皆不得为致良知;而凡「劳其筋骨,饿其体肤,空乏其身,行拂乱其所为,动心忍性以增益其所不能」者,皆所以致其良知也。若云宁不了事,不可不加培养者,亦是先有功利之心,计较成败利钝而爱憎取舍于其间。是以将了事自作一事,而培养又别作一事,此便有是内、非外之意,便是自私用智,便是「义外」,便有「不得于心勿求于气」之病,便不是致良知以求自慊之功矣。所云「鼓舞支持,毕事则困惫已甚」,又云「迫于事势,困于精力」,皆是把作两事做了,所以有此。凡学问之功,一则诚,二则伪,凡此皆是致良知之意欠诚一真切之故。《大学》言:「诚其意者,如恶恶臭,如好好色,此之谓自慊。」曾见有恶恶臭,好好色,而须鼓舞支持者乎?曾见毕事则困惫已甚者乎?曾有迫于事势,困于精力者乎?此可以知其受病之所从来矣。

来信又说:「老师说:『为学终身只是一事,不论有事无事,只是这一件。若说宁不了事、不可不加培养,却是分为两事了。』我私下觉得,觉精力衰弱、不足以终事的,是良知;宁不了事、且加休养,是致知。怎么却是两事?若事变之来,有事势不容不了,而精力虽衰,稍加鼓舞也能支撑,那是持志以帅气就行了。然而言动终无气力,办完事便困惫不堪,这不近于暴其气吗?这中间的轻重缓急,良知固然未尝不知;但或迫于事势,怎能顾精力?或困于精力,怎能顾事势?怎么办才好?」

「宁不了事,不可不加培养」这话,姑且对初学的人这样说,也不为无益;但作两事看了,便有病痛在。孟子讲「必有事焉」,那么君子之学终身只是「集义」一事。义就是宜,心得其宜叫作义。能致良知则心得其宜了,所以「集义」也只是致良知。君子酬酢万变,当行则行、当止则止、当生则生、当死则死,斟酌调停,无非是致其良知,以求自慊而已。所以「君子素其位而行」「思不出其位」。凡是谋划力所不及、强求知所不能的,都算不得致良知;而凡「劳其筋骨,饿其体肤,空乏其身,行拂乱其所为,动心忍性以增益其所不能」的,都是所以致其良知。至于说宁不了事、不可不加培养,也是先有功利之心,计较成败利钝而在其间爱憎取舍。于是把办事自己看作一事,培养又另看作一事,这便有是内非外之意,便是自私用智,便是「义外」,便有「不得于心勿求于气」的病,便不是致良知以求自慊的功夫了。所说「鼓舞支持,毕事则困惫已甚」,又说「迫于事势,困于精力」,都是把作两事做了,所以有这些。凡学问之功,一则是诚,二则是伪;这些都是致良知之意欠诚一真切的缘故。《大学》说:「诚其意者,如恶恶臭,如好好色,此之谓自慊。」可曾见过恶恶臭、好好色还需要鼓舞支持的?可曾见过办完事困惫不堪的?可曾见过迫于事势、困于精力的?由此可以知道病根的由来了。

Your letter further says: 'You said learning is lifelong one affair — affairs or none, this one thing; to say rather leave the affair undone than stint the nurturing is to make two. Yet to feel one's strength failing short of the affair — that is innate knowledge; rather leave it undone and rest — that is extension. How two? And when change drives in and the affair brooks no delay, strength flagging yet a little rallying suffices to carry on — hold the will to marshal the energies. But speech and motion lack all force, and the affair done, exhaustion is utter — is that not abusing one's energies? The weights and urgencies innate knowledge surely knows; yet pressed by circumstance, how mind one's strength? Sapped of strength, how mind circumstance? What is best?'

The saying rather-leave-undone-than-stint-nurturing, told to beginners, is not without use; taken as two things, the defect enters. Mencius's always-having-the-task makes the noble person's lifelong learning one affair only: accumulating rightness. Rightness is fitness: the mind finding its fit. Extending innate knowledge, the mind finds its fit — hence accumulating rightness is only extending innate knowledge. The noble person amid ten thousand changes: move when to move, stop when to stop, live when to live, die when to die — weighing and adjusting, all of it extending innate knowledge for self-content alone. Hence the noble person does what is proper to the station, and thought strays not beyond it. All scheming beyond one's strength and forcing beyond one's knowing fail to be extending innate knowledge; while all that taxes the sinews, starves the body, empties the self, confounds the doings — stirring the mind, steeling the nature, to increase what one cannot — is precisely extending innate knowledge. As for rather-leave-undone-than-stint-nurturing: there too a calculating heart of profit and loss runs first, weighing success and failure, love and hate, taking and leaving — so finishing affairs becomes one thing and nurturing another. That is approving the inner and condemning the outer, wit in selfishness, rightness made external, the sickness of failing-in-the-heart yet seeking-not-in-the-energies — no longer the work of extending innate knowledge toward self-content. Your rallying to carry through and collapsing after; your pressed by circumstance, sapped of strength — all from doing it as two things. In the work of learning, one is sincerity, two is pretense; all this is the intent of extension wanting singleness and earnestness. The Great Learning: making the intention sincere is hating a stench as a stench, loving beauty as beauty — this is self-content. Ever see one who hates a stench or loves beauty needing to rally and prop himself? Ever see him collapse when done? Pressed by circumstance, sapped of strength? From this the seat of the disease may be known.

171

来书又有云:「人情机诈百出,御之以不疑,往往为所欺;觉则自入于逆亿。夫逆诈,即诈也,亿不信,即非信也。为人欺,又非觉也。不逆、不亿而常先觉,其惟良知莹彻乎?然而出入毫忽之间,背觉合诈者多矣。」

不逆、不意而先觉,此孔子因当时人专以逆诈、亿不信为心,而自陷于诈与不信,又有不逆、不忆者,然不知致良知之功,而往往又为人所欺诈,故有是言,非教人以是存心,而专欲先觉人之诈与不信也。以是存心,即是后世猜忌险薄者之事;而只此一念,已不可与入尧、舜之道矣。不逆、不忆而为人所欺者,尚亦不先为善,但不如能致其良知,而自然先觉者之尤为贤耳。崇一谓「其惟良知莹彻」者,盖已得其旨矣。然亦颖悟所及,恐未实际也,盖良知之在人心,亘万古、塞宇宙而无不同,不虑而知,恒易以知险,不学而能,恒简以知阻,先天而天不违,天且不违,而况于人乎?况于鬼神乎?

夫谓背觉合诈者,是虽不逆人而或未能自欺也,虽不亿人而或未能果自信也,是或常有求先觉之心,而未能常自觉也。常有求先觉之心,即已流于逆、亿而足以自蔽其良知矣,此背觉合诈之所以未免也。君子学以为己,未尝虞人之欺己也,恒不自欺其良知而已;未尝虞人之不信己也恒自信其良知而已;未尝求先觉人之诈与不信也,恒务自觉其良知而已。是故不欺则良知无所伪而诚,诚则明矣;自信则良知无所惑而明,明则诚矣。明、诚相生,是故良知常觉常照;常觉常照则如明镜之悬,而物之来者自不能遁其妍㜐矣。何者?不欺而诚,则无所容其欺,荀有欺焉而觉矣;自信而明[1],则无所容其不信,苟不信焉而觉矣。是谓易以知险,简以知阻,子思所谓「至诚如神,可以前知」者也。然子思谓「如神」,谓「可以前知」,犹二而言之。是盖推言思诚者之功效,是犹为不能先觉者说也。若就至诚而言,则至诚之妙用,即谓之「神」,不必言「如神」,至诚则「无知而无不知」,不必言「可以前知」矣。

来信又说:「人情机诈百出,用不疑来对待,往往被人欺骗;有所觉察又自陷于逆诈臆不信。逆诈就是诈,臆不信就是不信;被人欺又不是觉。不逆不臆而常先觉,大概只有良知晶莹透彻的人吧?然而出入于毫忽之间、背离觉而投合诈的人多了。」

不逆不臆而先觉,这是孔子因为当时的人专以逆诈臆不信存心,自己陷于诈与不信;又有不逆不臆的人,却因不知致良知的功夫,往往又被人欺诈,所以才这样说。并不是教人拿这个存心、专想去预先觉察别人的诈与不信。拿这个存心,就是后世猜忌险薄之人所做的事;只这一念,就已不可能进入尧舜之道了。不逆不臆而被欺的,也还不失为善,只是不如能致其良知、自然先觉的人更为贤明罢了。崇一所说「其惟良知莹彻」,已得其宗旨;但那还是颖悟所及,恐怕未必是实际。良知之在人心,亘万古、塞宇宙而无不同:不虑而知,恒易以知险;不学而能,恒简以知阻;先天而天不违。天尚不违,何况于人?何况于鬼神?

所谓背觉合诈的人,是虽不逆人而未必不自欺,虽不臆人而未必果真自信,是常有求先觉之心而不能常自觉。常有求先觉之心,就已流于逆、臆,足以遮蔽自己的良知,这是背觉合诈所不能免的原因。君子学以为己,不曾忧虑别人欺骗自己,只是恒不自欺其良知而已;不曾忧虑别人不相信自己,只是恒自信其良知而已;不曾求预先觉察别人的诈与不信,只是恒求自觉其良知而已。所以不欺则良知无所虚伪而诚,诚则明;自信则良知无所惑而明,明则诚。明诚相生,所以良知常觉常照;常觉常照则如明镜高悬,事物之来自然不能遁其美丑了。为什么?不欺而诚,就无所容其欺,稍有欺焉便觉了;自信而明,就无所容其不信,稍有不信焉便觉了。这就是「易以知险,简以知阻」,也就是子思所谓「至诚如神,可以前知」。不过子思说「如神」、说「可以前知」,还是分作两截说,那是推论思诚者的功效,还是为不能先觉的人说的。若就至诚而言,至诚的妙用就叫作「神」,不必说「如神」;至诚则「无知而无不知」,不必说「可以前知」了。

Your letter further says: 'Human deceit takes a hundred shapes: meeting it with unsuspecting trust, one is often cheated; on guard, one falls into surmising deceit and doubting faith. Surmising deceit is itself deceit; doubting good faith, itself faithlessness; being cheated is not awareness either. Not surmising, not doubting, yet ever aware beforehand — that, I suppose, belongs only to one whose innate knowledge is crystal through. Yet between the flicker of a moment, those who turn from awareness and side with deceit are many.'

Not-surmising-not-doubting-yet-aware: Confucius said it because his age set its heart on surmising deceit and doubting faith, sinking itself into deceit and faithlessness; while others who did not surmise, knowing nothing of extending innate knowledge, were often cheated in turn. It was no lesson to store the mind with this and aim at smelling out others' deceit and faithlessness beforehand. To store the mind so is the trade of the suspicious and mean of later ages; that single thought already bars one from the way of Yao and Shun. The not-surmising yet cheated have still not first done ill — only they rank below those who extend innate knowledge and are aware beforehand of themselves. Your the crystal-through of innate knowledge has caught the point; yet it is the catch of quick wit, perhaps not the tasted fact. Innate knowledge in the human mind, through all ages, filling the universe, is everywhere one: knowing without deliberation, ever-easy to know danger; able without learning, ever-simple to know obstruction; prior to heaven, yet heaven does not contradict it. Heaven not contradicting — how much less men? How much less ghosts and spirits?

Those who turn from awareness and side with deceit: not surmising against others, yet perhaps not free of self-deception; not doubting others, yet perhaps not truly self-trusting; ever craving awareness beforehand, yet not ever self-aware. Ever craving awareness beforehand has already slid into surmising and doubting, enough to veil one's own innate knowledge — hence their inability to escape siding with deceit. The noble person learns for his own sake: never anxious lest others cheat him — only never cheating his own innate knowledge; never anxious lest others distrust him — only never distrusting his own innate knowledge; never seeking to sniff out others' deceit and faithlessness — only seeking ever to be aware in his own innate knowledge. Not cheating, innate knowledge is without pretense and hence sincere; sincere, hence bright. Self-trusting, innate knowledge is without doubt and hence bright; bright, hence sincere. Brightness and sincerity beget each other, and innate knowledge is ever aware, ever mirroring: a bright mirror hung on high — whatever comes cannot escape its fair-or-foul. Why? Not cheating and sincere, there is no room for cheating against one — the least cheating is felt; self-trusting and bright, no room for faithlessness — the least faithlessness is felt. That is the easy knowing danger, the simple knowing obstruction — Zisi's utmost sincerity like a spirit, able to know beforehand. Yet Zisi's like a spirit and able to know beforehand still speaks two: expounding the fruit of thinking-sincerity, said for those who cannot yet be aware beforehand. Of utmost sincerity itself, its wondrous working is the spirit — no need of like; utterly sincere, it knows nothing yet nothing it knows not — no need of beforehand.

  1. 「自信而明」,施本、俞本、德安府南本作「自信而诚」。
答歐陽崇一 · 卷中 | 传习录