来书云：「谓《大学》『格物』之说，专求本心，犹可牵合；至于《六经》、《四书》所载『多闻多见』、『前言往行』、『好古敏求』、『博学审问』、『温故知新』、『博学详说』、『好问好察』，是皆明白求于事为之际，资于论说之间者，用功节目固不容紊矣。」
「格物」之义，前已详悉，「牵合」之疑，想已不俟复解矣。
至于「多闻多见」，乃孔子因子张之务外好高，徒欲以多闻多见为学，而不能求诸其心，以阙疑殆，此其言行所以不免于尤悔。而所谓见闻者，适以资其务外好高而已，盖所以救子张多闻多见之病，而非以是教之为学也。夫子尝曰：「盖有不知而作之者，我无是也。」是犹孟子「是非之心，人皆有之」之义也。此言正所以明德性之良知非由于闻见耳。若曰「多闻择其善者而从之，多见而识之」，则是专求诸见闻之末，而已落在第二义矣，故曰：「如之次也。」夫以见闻之知为次，则所谓知之上者，果安所指乎？是可以窥圣门致知用力之地矣。夫子谓子贡曰：「赐也，汝以予为多学而识之者欤？非也，予一以贯之。」使诚在于「多学而识」，则夫子胡乃谬为是说以欺子贡者邪？「一以贯之」，非致其良知而何？
《易》曰：「君子多识前言往行，以畜其德。」夫以畜其德为心，则凡多识前言往行者，孰非畜德之事？此正知、行合一之功矣。
「好古敏求」者，好古人之学而敏求此心之理耳。心即理也。学者，学此心也；求者，求此心也。孟子云：「学问之道无他，求其放心而已矣。」非若后世广记博诵古人之言词，以为好古；而汲汲然惟以求功名利达之具于外者也。
「博学、审问」，前言已尽。
「温故、知新」，朱子亦以「温故」属之「尊德性」矣。德性岂可以外求哉？惟夫「知新」必由于「温故」，而「温故」乃所以「知新」，则亦可以验知、行之非两节矣。
「博学而详说之」者，「将以反说约也」。若无「反约」之云，则「博学、详说」者，果何事邪？
舜之「好问好察」，惟以用中而致其精一于道心耳。道心者，良知之谓也。
君子之学，何尝离去事为而废论说？但其从事于事为、论说者，要皆知、行合一之功，正所以致其本心之良知，而非若世之徒事口耳谈说以为知者，分知、行为两事，而果有节目先后之可言也。
来信说：「您说《大学》『格物』之说专求本心，还可以牵强附会；至于《六经》《四书》所载『多闻多见』『前言往行』『好古敏求』『博学审问』『温故知新』『博学详说』『好问好察』，都是明白地求之于事为之际、取资于论说之间的，用功的节目本不容紊乱。」
「格物」之义，前面已经详说，「牵合」的疑问，想必不必再解了。
至于「多闻多见」，是孔子因子张务外好高、只想以多闻多见为学，而不能求之于心、以存疑阙殆，所以他的言行不免有过尤悔恨。而所谓的见闻，恰恰只助长了他务外好高的毛病。这是救治子张多闻多见之病的话，并不是拿这个教人为学。夫子曾说：「大概有不知而妄作的人，我没有这种事。」这也正是孟子「是非之心，人皆有之」的意思。这话正说明德性之良知不是出于闻见。若说「多闻择其善者而从之，多见而识之」，那是专求于见闻之末，已落在第二义了，所以说「是知之次也」。以见闻之知为次，那么所谓知之上者，究竟指什么呢？由此可以窥见圣门致知用力的地方了。夫子对子贡说：「赐啊，你以为我是多学而记之的人吗？不是，我一以贯之。」假使真在于多学而记，夫子为什么竟谬说这话来欺子贡呢？「一以贯之」，不是致其良知又是什么？
《易》说：「君子多识前言往行，以畜其德。」以畜其德为心，那么多识前言往行，哪一件不是畜德之事？这正是知行合一的功夫。
所谓「好古敏求」，是喜好古人之学而敏求此心之理罢了。心就是理。学，是学这个心；求，是求这个心。孟子说：「学问之道没有别的，求其放心而已矣。」并不像后世广泛记诵古人的言词以为是好古，而汲汲于向外求功名利禄的工具。
「博学审问」，前面已经说尽。
「温故知新」，朱子也把「温故」归属于「尊德性」了。德性难道可以外求吗？正因为「知新」必由于「温故」，而「温故」正是用来「知新」的，也就可以验证知与行并非两截。
「博学而详说之」，是「将要反过来简约地陈述」。若没有「反约」一说，那博学详说究竟是为了什么呢？
舜的「好问好察」，只是要用法中之道，把精一达到道心上。道心，就是良知。
君子之学，何尝离开事为、废弃论说？只是他从事的事为、论说，都是知行合一的功夫，正是要致其本心的良知，而不像世上那些只以口耳谈说为知的人，把知行分作两事，当真有什么节目先后可言。
Your letter says: 'That the Great Learning's investigating things seeks the mind alone might yet be stretched to fit; but the classics' many phrases — hear much, see much; former words and past deeds; love the ancients and earnestly seek; learn broadly and inquire; warm the old and know the new; study broadly and expound; love to ask and observe — all plainly seek amid affairs and draw upon discourse; the order of work brooks no confusion.'
The sense of investigating things was set out fully before; the charge of forced fitting needs no second answer.
As to hearing and seeing much: Confucius spoke so because Zizhang pursued the outward and the lofty, would make hearing-and-seeing itself his learning, and would not seek in his mind or leave the doubtful in suspense — hence his words and deeds earned blame and regret; the seen and heard only fed his fault. It was medicine for Zizhang's illness, not a curriculum. The Master said: there are those who act without knowing; I am not so — the very sense of Mencius's sense of right and wrong, all men have it: virtue's innate knowledge does not arise from hearing and seeing. To hear much and choose the good to follow, see much and remember — that seeks the twig-ends of sight and hearing, already second-best: hence it is called the next best to knowledge. If hearing-and-seeing knowledge is the next best, what is the best? Here is glimpsed where the school applied its strength in extending knowledge. The Master said to Zigong: Si, do you take me for one who learns much and remembers? No — one thread through all. Were it truly much learning and remembering, why would he mock Zigong with a lie? The one thread — what is it but extending innate knowledge?
The Changes: the noble person records many former words and past deeds to store up virtue. With storing virtue as the heart, every recording of former words is storing virtue — precisely the work of unity of knowledge and action.
Loving the ancients and earnestly seeking: loving the ancients' learning and keenly seeking this mind's principle. The mind is principle; learning learns this mind; seeking seeks this mind. Mencius: the way of learning is nothing else but seeking the lost mind. Not as later ages, widely reciting the ancients' phrases and calling it love of antiquity while eagerly hunting tools for fame and profit outside.
Broad learning and inquiry — already fully treated.
Warming the old and knowing the new — Zhu Xi himself put warming the old under honoring the moral nature. Can virtue's nature be sought outside? Since knowing the new must come through warming the old, and warming the old is for knowing the new, this too proves knowledge and action no two stages.
Study broadly and expound — in order to return to stating it sparingly. Without that return, what would the broad study and full expounding be for?
Shun's loving to ask and observe was solely to hold to the mean, bringing refinement and unity to bear on the mind of the Way. The mind of the Way is innate knowledge.
The noble person's learning never leaves affairs or discards discourse; but the affairs and discourse he engages in are all the work of knowledge and action united, precisely to extend his mind's innate knowledge — unlike the world's talkers of mouth and ear who split knowledge and action into two things with a real order of stages to recite.